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Abstract: 
This paper examines the impact of small arms and light weapons (SALW) transfers on the 
economic development of Central America in the years following the armed conflicts of the 
1980s and 90s. While a great deal of attention has been paid to armed violence in general, the 
economic effects SALW transfers to developing countries have not been sufficiently deciphered. 
Specific details of the effects of SALW transfers on economic development need to be clearly 
understood if poverty alleviation goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals, are to be 
met by 2015. This paper conducts regression analyses on the imports of SALW and selected 
economic indicators in Central America from 1995-2011 using data from the World Bank and 
U.N. Comtrade to attempt to illuminate these details. Despite the well-known fact that SALW 
are destructive to economic development, results herein are inconclusive.  
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Introduction: The Problem of Small Arms 
Small arms & light weapons—hereby referred to as “SALW” or “small arms”—are the 
primary ingredient in a wide range of violent acts committed across the globe including uprisings 
of paramilitary groups, human rights violations committed by nefarious regimes, and acts of 
terrorism. The proliferation and misuse of SALW jeopardizes security, impedes economic 
growth, and undermines fragile states. SALW have been the primary weapon used in 90% of 
conflicts in the world since 1990 (Bourne, Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms 
2007, 3). There are a multitude of factors that contribute to their demand including low price, 
availability, simplicity, durability, and most importantly, efficacy. They are also very difficult for 
law enforcement officials to track, as the line between legal and illegal weapons is often elusive. 
These factors, among others, contribute to make SALW responsible for 500,000 fatalities per 
year across the globe—the most of any weapon category—of which 200,000 are made up by 
homicides outside of conflict zones (Hogendoorn and Stohl 2010). According to former U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, “In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could 
well be described as weapons of mass destruction” (Annan 2000, 52).  
Despite the catastrophes caused by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), small arms 
deserve as much attention, if not 
more. At present there are 
roughly 875 million small arms 
in the world according to the 
Small Arms Survey—a figure 
on the rise in recent years—of 
which somewhere between two-thirds and three-fourths are in the hands of civilians. The 
  
Small arms and light weapons include hand guns, rifles and 
carbines, assault rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, 
portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, 
MANPADS, and mortars of calibers less than 100mm. 
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growing number of SALW in the world is reflected in global trade. In 2012 the Small Arms 
survey estimated the annual trade in authorized small arms to be around $8.5 billion. When the 
illicit market is accounted for, the number easily extends past $10 billion. This number has 
increased drastically in recent years. As recent as 2006, the Small Arms survey estimated the 
figures for the licit and illicit market to be $1.5 billion and $4 billion respectively (Hogendoorn 
and Stohl 2010). Scholars and policymakers alike should be concerned with this rapid increase in 
the flow of SALW and what it means for developing countries.  
Whether they’re imported legally or illegally, small arms are especially detrimental to 
developing countries. Roughly 90% of armed conflicts between the early 90s to the early 2000s 
occurred in developing nations (Small Arms Survey 2003). Reasons abound for this condition. 
Developing nations typically have less stable governments, greater income inequality, and more 
resource-constrained law enforcement; all factors that increase the likelihood of conflict, making 
developing nations more prone to armed conflict. Given that 90% of armed conflicts since 1990 
have been carried out with SALW, and that 90% of armed conflicts over the same time period 
occurred in developing nations, it is safe to conclude that the vast majority of global armed-
conflicts over the past two decades have been in developing nations where SALW were the 
primary weapon. This relationship has caused analysts at the World Bank, the UN, and scholars 
in International Relations and Economic Development to conclude that SALW proliferation is a 
major problem hindering the developing world from sustainable economic growth. 
Although not the focus of this paper, it is worth noting the benefits small arms can 
provide developing nations. Many studies indicate the positive effects small arms imports have 
on economic growth by providing technical skills, educational training, creating infrastructure 
necessary to economic development, and increasing productivity through technical advancement. 
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Empirical evidence for these arguments has been provided by Beniot (1978), Ward, et al. (1991), 
Alexander (1995), Chletsos and Kollias (1995), Sezgin (2000), Nikolaidu (2001), and Yilidirim, 
Sezgin and Ocal (2005), among others. Additionally, small arms imports can help unstable 
governments fight off violent insurgents as imports are more cost-effective than the domestic 
production of these weapons for many nations. While these positive effects are legitimate, 
policymakers are becoming increasingly aware of the negative impacts of small arms transfers 
on economic development. One of the earliest actions that signified this realization was the 
adoption of a Code of Conduct for Arms Exports by the European Union (EU) in 1998. This 
policy requires EU member nations to assess “the compatibility of an arms export with the 
technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that 
states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for 
armaments of human and economic resources.” (European Union Council 1998, 7).  
Many researchers have determined the negative effects armed violence causes on 
economic development (Buchanan and Muggah n.d.; Godnick, Muggah, and Waszink 2002; 
Hogendoorn and Stohl 2010; Muggah and Batchelor 2002; Serrano-Berthet and Lopez 2011). 
However, insufficient research has been undertaken on the specific role arms transfers play in 
this process (Bourne, Chalmers, et al. 2004; Brauer and Dunne 2004). By undertaking a 
quantitative analysis of the SALW trade to Central America from 1995-2011 this paper attempts 
to answer two questions: 1.) To what degree is the trade of these weapons responsible for 
impeding economic development? 2.) How are those effects changed when SALW are 
transported to countries that already have a surplus of those weapons and a history of conflict, 
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such as Central America?  Central America
1
 (see Figure 1 for a map of the region) is an ideal 
region to examine this question, 
not only because of its history of 
armed conflict, but also because 
each of the eight countries in this 
study shares similar geographic 
characteristics due to their 
proximity to one another. This 
feature is an added benefit for empirical analysis as it allows many similarities to be held 
constant across the region, leading to more robust results.  
Understanding how transfers of small arms impact economic development is imperative 
for policymakers in major small arms exporting countries to understand if looming initiatives, 
such as the U.N.’s Millennium Development Goals to reduce world poverty by 2015, are to be 
accomplished. This knowledge also has benefits for security policy. The civil wars that plagued 
Central America in the 1980s may have ended, but many of the weapons remained in the region 
long afterwards allowing for armed violence to become prevalent. This overflow of weapons has 
led to the weakening of many societal institutions and transformed the region into a breeding 
ground for international drug cartels, which are becoming a threat to American security.  
 
Figure 1: Map of Central America and Mexico 
                                                          
1
 Central America typically refers to the countries of Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
and Nicaragua. Mexico will also be included in this analysis because it shares many conditions of Central American 
countries such as insecurity and inequality. Also, the Mexican drug war has many implications for the security and 
economic growth of Central America. 
All of the Central American countries are considered to be 
developing according to the World Bank. Except for Costa 
Rica and Panama, all are considered to be lower-middle 
income countries; Costa Rica and Panama are considered 
upper-middle. Despite the fact that Mexico is significantly 
wealthier than its Central American neighbors, it is still 
categorized as a developing nation by the World Bank. 
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Source: Kellogg Institute for International Studies 
This study is comprised of six sections. It begins with a brief overview of the current 
inventory of small arms in Central America, and how they contribute to the area’s growing 
homicide rate, as well as an overview of the current trade dynamics of SALW to Central 
America in order to provide context for the rest of the paper. Section two reviews literature that 
assesses the various negative impacts of small arms and light weapons on economic development 
in Central America and other developing nations. Section three provides a framework that 
illustrates the various ways SALW imports may negatively affect economic development. In 
section four, information and methodology about the data is discussed. Section five reveals 
inconclusive regression results from a series of regressions on arms imports and a select few 
economic variables. Lastly, section six concludes by hypothesizing reasons for the inconclusive 
results and offering advice to future similar studies.  
 
Section 1: Small Arms in Central America—A History of Violence 
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1.1: Overview of SALW in the Region 
Central America is experiencing a crisis of small arms. In addition to the destructive 
conflicts of the 1980s, which included lengthy civil wars in Nicaragua (1979-1990), El Salvador 
(1980-1992), and Guatemala (1960-1996), economic hardships such as poverty, unemployment, 
and inequality make Central America even more vulnerable for armed violence. Although these 
conflicts ceased decades ago, and there are currently no insurgencies active in the region, 
violence remains the norm because of elongated government wars against drug cartels and other 
organized gangs—most notably the Mexican Drug War. In fact, some security analysts argue the 
current situation is more detrimental to regional security than the civil wars of the 1980s (Dudley 
2010). Security threats are not the only problem—economic growth is being hindered as well. 
The IMF recently estimated that the armed violence in Central America
2
 amounts to a loss of 
7.5% a year in GDP on average (Serrano-Berthet and Lopez 2011). 
Many of the small arms that flood the region today are the same weapons that were 
imported to the region to furnish the aforementioned conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Nicaragua. In some cases, the United States and its allies supplied arms to both the state and the 
insurgent groups, which in large part led to the current overflow of small arms in the region. 
These weapons, primarily assault rifles, are durable goods that remain in useable condition. 
Furthermore, the assault rifle has not undergone significant technology upgrades since the cold 
war, leaving these old weapons nearly as effective as new weapons. Even though thousands of 
weapons were collected at the termination of the civil wars (360,000 at the end of the El 
Salvadorian civil war, 1,824 in Guatemala, and 17,000 in Nicaragua), scholars estimate the sum 
                                                          
2
 Due to data unavailability, this figure does not include Belize, México, or Panama.  
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of unaccounted weapons in the region today could exceed one million (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime 2012). 
The majority of hand guns circulating in the region today were purchased legally from 
the United States (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2012). However, many of these 
weapons that are imported legally are re-routed to illicit markets with the help of legitimate arms 
dealers who serve as fronts for criminal organizations. In addition, there are many handguns 
smuggled to the region illicitly that go undetected due to lack of security. Table 1 provides a 
brief overview of the magnitude of firearms currently circulating in the region, as well as the 
varying degrees of gun rights within each country. Compared to the rest of the world, the region 
can be characterized by high gun ownership and restrictive gun laws. This combination does not 
appear to be increasing safety or development throughout the region. Honduras is the perfect 
example, as they have the strictest gun laws in the region and the highest homicide rates in the 
world.  
Table 1: Firearms in Central America 
 
Sources: firearm data (1st 3 columns) comes from UNODC (2011). Gun Rights Index obtained from FreeExistence.org (2009). 
The majority of the armed violence in the region today is carried out by drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs). Mexico was the first country in the region to face a significant security 
Country
World Rank on 
firearm ownership
Average firearm 
per 100,000
Estimated total 
firearms 
Gun rights index 
(> numbers mean 
more restrictions)
Belize 62 10              29,000 4.2
Costa Rica 64 9.9 430,000           3.6
El Salvador 92 5.8 400,000           3.3
Guatemala 49 13.1 1,650,000         4.8
Honduras 88 6.2 500,000           3
Mexico 42 15 15,500,000       3.9
Nicaragua 77 7.7 395,000           4.8
Panama 26 21.7 700,000           4.97
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threat from DTOs. To help combat the problem, the Mexican government initiated the “War on 
Drugs” in the 1990s. However, as a result of measures taken by the Mexican government to 
combat the problem, DTOs in Mexico began shifting pieces of their operations to Central 
America where legal institutions are weaker and police forces are more resource-constrained; a 
similar effect occurred for DTOs in Colombia after the Colombian government’s crackdown. 
This has resulted in increases in both violence and corruption of government officials in the 
region (Meyer and Seelke 2012). Not only are these gangs involved in narcotics trafficking, but 
many are broadening their operations to include extortion and kidnapping. The effects are 
deteriorating regional security, and causing concern for the security of neighboring countries 
such as the United States.  
There is little doubt that Central America’s surplus in small arms is primarily responsible 
for the region’s alarming homicide rate. Central America has the highest homicide rate for any 
region throughout the world with 41 homicides for every 100,000 people of the population. 
Southern Africa comes in a distant second with 30.5. In 2011, Honduras had the highest 
homicide rate of any country in the world (91.6), and El Salvador came in second (69.2).  To put 
this in perspective, consider in 2010 there were 44,161 homicides in the region, including 
Mexico. In the same year, Bangladesh—whose population in 2010 was only slightly greater than 
Central America and Mexico combined—had only around 4,000 homicides. Graph 1 shows 
annual homicides in Central America and Mexico from 1995-2010. Homicides fell from 1995-
2004 before rising moderately until 2007 when they began to increase drastically. The declining 
trend that emerged after 1995 is surprising when considering the recent end of the civil wars in 
the region. Something worth noting not depicted in the graph below is the discrepancy between 
homicide rates in northern and southern Central America. The northern part of the region, which 
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includes Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, constitutes that vast majority of 
homicides across the region (an average of 57.32 in 2010). Homicide rates in the southern 
countries remain consistently low (an average of 15.5 in 2010). However, due to increasing 
violence in the southern region there is growing concern that these countries could soon become 
havens for the DTOs that plague the north (World Bank 2011). Research typically shows that 
homicide rates remain high after conflict, making the declining trend beginning in 1995 a 
pleasant surprise. However the recent spike in homicides in 2007 should be of great concern to 
the region. 
Graph 1 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
Despite the clear relationship between small arms and violence, the debate continues 
about whether greater access to small arms in itself leads to an increase of violence. Some 
scholars contend that it is no-brainer that increases of small arms will lead to more violence, 
while others argue that increases of some small arms indicate a society where citizens have better 
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means of self-defense. However it has been shown that increases in firearms intensifies violence 
and leads to increases the case-fatality rate in assaults (Cook and Ludwig 2006). It has also been 
shown that armed criminality is particularly violent in post-conflict countries due to availability 
of weapons and high unemployment rates for youths (Hogendoorn and Stohl 2010). This is 
exactly what happened in El Salvador after civil war in that country ended 1992. In 1990, 
roughly 55% of homicides in El Salvador were carried out with firearms, however by 1995 that 
number jumped to 75% (Godnick, Muggah and Waszink 2002). Table 2 shows this problem 
persistent in El Salvador up until 2008. Upon examining Table 2, it is clear that firearms have 
played an increasing role in homicides for all of Central America since 2005. The most 
noticeable results are in Mexico, where the percentage has nearly doubled during the last half 
decade as the war on drugs continues. By comparison, homicides committed with firearms in the 
United States have ranged between 65%-69% over 2005-2010.  
Table 2: Percent of Firearm Related Homicides in Central America and Mexico, 2005-
2010
3
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Belize 50.6% 40.2% 42.3% 64.1% 48.5% 52.3% 
Costa Rica 58.5% 57.3% N/A N/A  N/A N/A 
El Salvador  77.0% 78.2% N/A 76.9% N/A N/A 
Guatemala 79.4% 78.3% 82.6% 83.2% 83.2% 84.0% 
Honduras 76.0% 78.2% 75.0% 80.3% 81.4% 83.4% 
Mexico  28.5% 30.7% 39.4% 38.6% 54.6% 54.9% 
Nicaragua N/A N/A N/A 35.2% 42.1% N/A 
Panama  57.1% 68.7% 65.1% 79.4% 81.5% 75.0% 
Average  61.0% 61.7% 60.9% 58.2% 65.2% 69.9% 
                                                                                                                                          
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
                                                          
3
 This chart only goes back to 2005 because prior periods in Central America were very scarce in reporting this 
data. 
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The drastic increase of the homicides in Central America over the last five years shown 
earlier in Graph 1 is in line with trends in imports of small arms to the region over the same time 
period. Graph 2 shows the total amount of small arms imported to Central America and Mexico 
from 1995-2011. The similarities between Graphs 1 and 2 suggest a very strong relationship 
between SALW imports and homicides. 
Graph 2 
                         
Source: U.N. Comtrade. All data in current U.S. dollars. 
 
1.2 Overview of Current SALW Trade to the Region 
The Small Arms Survey categorizes nations as “major importers” of SALW if their 
annual SALW imports exceed $100 million (U.S. Dollars). By this standard, the nations of 
Central America are nowhere near being a major importer of SALW; even when the region’s 
figures are aggregated, as in Graph 2, they are still far short of this threshold. Graph 3 shows the 
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country by country breakdown of total imports to the region from 1995-2011, and Graph 4 shows 
a per capita breakdown of the same data.  
Graph 3  
 
Source: U.N. Comtrade  
 Not surprisingly, Graph 3 reveals that Mexico, by far the wealthiest nation in the region, 
is the primary importer of SALW to the region. In addition to its surplus in wealth over the other 
countries, Mexico is facing a high demand for SALW because of the “war” the government has 
waged on criminal gangs and narcotics traffickers. However, Graph 4 shows a breakdown of the 
per capita imports. In this case, Belize is the primary importer while Mexico is fourth.  
Graph 4  
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Source: U.N. Comtrade 
The suppliers of small arms to Central America are very diverse. For example, roughly a 
dozen different countries were responsible for small arms imports in Nicaragua in 2009, despite 
that Nicaragua’s imports of SALW totaled less than 1 Million USD for that year. The United 
States is the prominent supplier of SALW to the region in terms of value; although Germany, 
France, and Turkey rival the U.S. in terms of frequency. Mexico is the only country in Central 
America with significant involvement in the SALW trade. In 2009, the value of their imports of 
SLAW was roughly USD 40 million.
4
 In the other countries throughout the region, SALW 
imports do not exceed even USD 4 million, and in some cases are less than USD 1 million 
(Belize, Nicaragua, Panama). Despite that SALW imports are not considered high in the region, 
they have been drastically increasing over the last five years (see Graph 2). The region is also 
                                                          
4
 These data are from a different database than the Small Arms Survey. It’s from the data used in my regressions 
and does not include cartridges and ammunition of SALW such as pistols, revolvers, and machine guns. It also does 
not include shotguns, rifles, their parts, accessories, and ammunition. However, even if these categories were 
factored it would not significantly alter the dynamic of the comparisons made here.  
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awash with small arms from the civil wars of the 1980’s. Furthermore, despite that the other 
Central American countries pale in comparison in SALW imports to the U.S. and the European 
Union, firearms play a much larger role in criminal activities such as homicides, robberies, and 
kidnappings in Central America.  
 
Section 2: Literature Review 
 Godnick, Muggah, and Waszink (2002) review the impact of small arms in Central 
America in the years following armed conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua that 
plagued the region in the 1980s. As a result of these conflicts, and others, the region remains 
awash in small arms to this day. Many of these weapons have flowed from conflict zones to 
previously peaceful countries of Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama where they are 
primarily used in the narcotics trade and by youth gangs to commit crimes. As a result, the 
region began to experience high homicide rates. Other consequences are increases in armed 
robberies, kidnapping, and children killed by stray bullets.  
Small arms create enormous security and development hurdles for the countries they 
plague (Hogendoorn and Stohl 2010). Stohl and Hogendoorn from the Center for American 
Progress examine the direct and indirect effects of small arms on economic development. Even 
decades after civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, the availability of small arms is tied to 
alarmingly high homicide rates. In 1999 alone, this violence cost Guatemala roughly $565 
million dollars compared to a $575 million dollar loss of GDP as a result of the 1981-85 civil 
war. Other indirect effects of small arms include the erosion of social services, a decline in 
formal economic activities and a rise in illegal activity, the distortion of savings, investment, and 
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revenue collection. They also find that Small arms and light weapons are not only a problem for 
the poorer countries of the region. Mexico is an example of how small arms availability can be 
troublesome for a medium income country. The small arms spread in Mexico has increased 
homicides, undermined local authorities, and created security concerns for many citizens. 
It is important to realize the negative economic consequences of SALW are widespread 
and can be measured with a multitude of factors. The Small Arms Survey’s Unfinished Business 
(2006) shows skyrocketing health costs and productivity losses are serious consequences of 
small arms violence. Researchers found that the average medical cost of a single gunshot wound 
to be around $4,500 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil—nearly three times as much as a stab wound in the 
same city.  The researchers then extrapolated the costs in Rio de Janeiro to the entire country of 
Brazil and estimated a total cost of $90 million in direct health costs for 1999. They applied the 
same method to Bogota, and estimated total health costs in Colombia as a result of small arms to 
be roughly $40 million. Furthermore, their studies calculated productivity losses of 
approximately $10 and $4 million in Brazil and Colombia respectively.  
Research on the exact ways which arms transfers affect economic development and 
poverty is scant, but scholars (Bourne, Chalmers, et al. 2004) of the Armed Violence and Poverty 
Initiative (AVPI)  at Bradford University attempt to shed light on this subject. They advocate that 
arms exporters use “balance sheets” which show the particular impact on poverty of a particular 
transfer of arms. These balance sheets balance out the benefits of arms transfers such as 
increased security and stimulated growth, with potentially negative consequences such as 
crowding out effects, possible exacerbation of inter-state and intra-state conflict, and increasing 
corruption. They find that the impact of arms imports on inter-state and intra-state conflict varies 
considerably, while the impact on resource diversion and corruption are almost always negative. 
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Their final conclusion is that a full assessment of the net impact of arms transfers on 
development and poverty requires a thorough understanding of the use and cost of the arms in 
question, which can only be determined on a case by case basis.  
Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne have done significant research on offset agreements, 
which obligate the arms seller to reinvest (offset) arms sales proceeds in the purchasing country 
(Brauer and Dunne 2004). Offsets occur because countries that import defense supplies look to 
reduce the cost as much as possible in order to lead to economic growth and in turn gain public 
support of the arms deal. In a sense, it is an attempt for emerging economies to have the best of 
both worlds—a strong national defense and robust domestic industries. However, to date there 
has been little research done on how well offsets spawn economic growth. Brauer and Dunne 
find no evidence that offsets reduce the cost of arms acquisitions, nor lead to substantial or 
sustained job creation. Additionally, they fail to find that offset agreements lead to successful 
technology transfer to the civilian sector, and only little technology transfer to the military 
sector; often over decades and at high cost. Furthermore, any technology that is transferred is 
dramatically outpaced by continuous technology advancements in developing countries.  
 
Section 3: Frameworks for Studying SALW Imports and Development 
 The destructive consequences of small arms and light weapons have long been studied by 
scholars in international development, yet frameworks to understand the particular ways the 
SALW trade affects developing countries remain scant. Criterion 8 of the aforementioned 
European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports mentions that member nations should take 
into account “the desirability that [recipient] states should achieve their legitimate needs of 
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security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.” 
This focus on the opportunity cost associated with military expenditures incurred by developing 
nations was the focus of much early research on the impact of arms imports on developing 
nations (Brauer and Dunne 2004; Haines, RJ 2004; Markowski and Hall, P 2004; Martin, S 
1996; Perlo-Freeman 20004; Taylor 2004).  
 However, the economic impact of SALW imports extends beyond mere resource 
diversion and opportunity costs. Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004) argue that SALW imports can 
additionally hinder economic development by leading to increases in inter-state conflict, intra-
state conflict, and government corruption. Increases in inter-state and intra-state conflict can 
indirectly lead to stunted economic growth by weakening security, injuring and displacing 
workers, and increasing health costs; even though there are some cases where SALW transfers 
benefit developing countries by allowing weak governments to defend themselves from 
insurgencies and aggressive neighboring nations. Additionally, the trade in small arms can have 
significant impacts for corruption in countries importing these weapons. Corruption in the arms 
trade leads to negative effects on economic growth by increasing recipient costs and 
undermining links between arms supplies and legitimate security requirements. Furthermore, the 
“benefits” of corruption in the arms trade tend to be used towards criminal means, instead of for 
the good of the entire economy Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004).  
 The findings of Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004) were seminal in the study of how arms 
imports impede economic development in the developing world. In order to analyze how the 
SALW trade is affecting the economic development of Central America, this paper uses their 
framework and applies it to the region. There are a couple contributions this paper hopes to make 
by using this process. First, Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004) do not use regression analysis in 
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their study. By applying a regression analysis to the Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004) framework, 
this paper attempts to measure their results empirically to see if they hold for Central America. 
Additionally, by conducting this analysis on Central America for the years 1995-2011, this paper 
seeks to determine whether or not small arms transfers to developing nations already awash in 
small arms, such as Central America, have the same detrimental effect as they do in developing 
nations without such a significant history of small arms violence. Shining light on this question 
will help determine to what degree new weapons are causing harm in the region, or if the damage 
is being done primarily by weapons already circulating throughout the region. This knowledge 
will help policymakers decide whether or not they need to handle the problem of SALW 
proliferation with stockpile reduction tactics, or policies designed to staunch the trade of SALW 
to developing nations.  
 In addition to the methods presented by (Bourne, Chalmers, et al. 2004), this paper adds 
two additional methods to study the impact of SALW imports on economic development. GDP 
growth is studied alongside arms imports, as is tourism expenditures. Using the data covered in 
the next section, regressions will be run with the following dependent variables: government 
stability, corruption, GDP growth, and tourism expenditures. Arms imports per capita (lagged 
one year) is the primary control variable in all of the equations. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the data 
and detail the results respectively.   
Section 4: Methodology and Data 
4.1: Models and Hypotheses  
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 The following four models are used to measure stability, corruption, GDP growth, and 
tourism expenditures, against the imports of small arms in Central America and Mexico from 
1995-2011.  
Model 1: Stability =β + βImports_percapita + βArmed_forces + βAgriculture + 
βCorrupt + βEnergy + βGDP_grow + βIndustry + βIntent_homicides + βLife_expect + 
βRule_of_law + βTour_expend + βUnemployment + βVoice_and_accountability + βYear 
+ βBelize + βCosta_rica + βEl_salvador + βGuatemala + βHonduras + βNicaragua + 
βPanama + µ 
H1: I expect Imports per capita to be negatively correlated with stability.  
Model 2: Corruption = β + βImports_percapita + βDemocracy + βEducation + 
βFemale_parliament  + βGDP_grow + βGovt_effective + βIndustry + 
βIntent_homicides + βLife_expect + βRule_of_law + βStabiliy + βUnemployment + 
βYear + βBelize + βCosta_rica + βEl_salvador + βGuatemala + βHonduras + 
βNicaragua + βPanama + µ 
H2: I expect Imports per capita to be negatively correlated with corruption.  
 Model 3: GDP Growth =β + βImports_percapita + βAgriculture + βCorrupt + 
 βEducation +  βEnergy + FDI + βIndustry + βIntent_homicides + βLife_expect + 
 βPopulation + βRule_of_law + βStabiliy + βTour_expend + βUnemployment + 
 βVoice_and_accountability + βYear + βBelize + βCosta_rica + βEl_salvador + 
 βGuatemala + βHonduras + βNicaragua + βPanama + µ 
 H3: I expect imports per capita to be negatively correlated with GDP growth.  
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 Model 4: Tourism Expenditures = β + βImports_percapita + βDemocracy + βEducation 
 + βEnergy + βIndustry + βIntent_homicides + βLife_expect + βStabiliy + βYear + 
 βBelize + βCosta_rica + βEl_salvador +  βGuatemala + βHonduras + βNicaragua + 
 βPanama + µ 
 H4: I expect imports per capita to be negatively correlated with tourism expenditures.  
4.2: Empirical Methods 
In order to examine the impact of small arms on conflict as Bourne, Chalmers, et al. 
(2004) did, I use the “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” indicator provided by the 
World Governance Indicators,
5
 an initiative of the World Bank—hereby referred to as 
“Stability.” The Stability variable measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means—including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. Due to restrictions in data availability, I am not able to 
examine inter-state and intra-state conflict separately as done in Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004); 
instead stability is used to measure both. Stability, as is every other WGI, is reported in two 
forms: the standard normal units of the governance indicator, ranging from around -2.5 to 2.5 (a 
higher number indicates a more stable government), and in percentile rank ranging from 0 
(lowest stability) to 100 (highest stability). I use rank data in my regressions as I anticipate it to 
be more specific than percentile data, which is often rounded. Additionally, percentile figures 
base a country’s performance in a selected indicator on the performance of other countries, 
which could easily distort the selected countries actual performance.  
                                                          
5
 The WGI are produced by Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings Institution; Aart Kraay, World Bank Development Research 
Group; and Massimo Mastruzzi, World Bank Institute. 
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A primary weakness of the Stability measure compiled by the WGI is its bluntness. It is a 
broad indicator in nature; compiled by roughly 30 different sources. Additionally, these 
measurements are only perceptions of citizens on the stability of their government; instead of 
exact measures of conflict. As a result of these weaknesses, other possible measures for conflict 
were considered. The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) conducts research on peace and 
conflict resolution. PRIO has collaborated with Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, in the production of a dataset of 
armed conflicts, both internal and external, from 1946-present. This dataset is beneficial because 
it specifically accounts for conflict and delineates between internal and external conflict. In 
addition, there is the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), which is the most 
comprehensive public collection of political violence data for developing countries. To date 
ACLED has recorded over 60,000 events including battles, human rights abuses, riots, protests, 
and even non-violent activities such as rebel recruitment, arrests, or base establishment. 
However, a variable specifically measuring conflict would not be possible to use for the region 
as a whole, since conflict has only occurred in a handful of the countries. The Stability measure 
is preferred because it is measured annually for all of Central America and Mexico.  
For Model 2 (Corruption), the WGI Control of Corruption indicator is used. Similar to 
Stability, the Control of Corruption indicator is also based on perceptions. Specifically, the 
perceptions of citizens on the degree of public power that is being used for private gain; 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. Unlike data on conflict, which presented a difficult task to locate for this paper, 
this data on corruption from the WGI is almost certainly the best available data for the purposes 
of this paper.  
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Per capita arms imports (lagged one year) is used as the primary independent variable in 
all four models. The per capita form of imports is used as a way to standardize the imports data 
across the region. Without any standardization, the regional import figures would be almost 
entirely dominated by Mexico. Per capita normalization is favored over other methods such as 
percent of GDP as it is the aim of this paper to learn about the damage that can be done with 
small arms by one person, adding the personal element will hopefully draw more attention from 
policymakers to the issue of small arms. The data is also lagged one year because it is expected 
that arms imports to a country wouldn’t have a tangible effect on economic growth until the 
following year. Additional regressions were ran for each model with other methods of measuring 
arms imports such as the aggregate value of arms imports (lagged one year), imports as a 
percentage of GDP (lagged one year), Imports growth as a percentage of GDP, and imports 
growth per capita. However, none of these different methods yielded statistically significant 
results.
6
  
Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004) was consulted when preparing the full set of independent 
variables for the models on stability and corruption. Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004) specifically 
list GDP growth, democratic government, investment, infrastructure, and violence as factors 
leading to conflict. As a result, my model includes GDP growth, a democracy indicator; 
agriculture, energy, and industry (infrastructure); and intentional homicides as independent 
variables, among others. Additionally they claim laggard GDP growth also leads to corruption. 
Treisman (2007) was also consulted for factors that cause corrupt governments. Treisman (2007) 
cites the efficacy of a country’s legal system, societal norms toward rule following, civic 
freedoms, government stability, GDP growth, and democratic governments as factors that lead to 
                                                          
6
 These will be made available by the author on request 
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a country being less corrupt. The WGI provide additional indicators that can be used to proxy for 
some of these factors. In my regressions, I use the Voice and Accountability indicator as well as 
the Female Parliament variable
7
 to measure for civic freedoms such as freedom of speech, 
expression, association, press, and gender equality. The Rule of Law indicator is used to capture 
norms towards following the general rules of society. Lastly, the Government Effectiveness 
indicator is used as a proxy to indicate the strength of a society’s legal system and other 
government institutions.  
The insight of additional scholars was sought for the full set of independent variables for 
the models on GDP growth and tourism expenditures. Barro (1991) cites endogenous variables 
such as human capital, infrastructure, and investment as factors leading to economic growth. 
These findings are consistent with earlier models on endogenous growth such as Solow (1956), 
Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965). In line with Barro (1991), my regressions include indicators 
on education and life expectancy (human capital); and indicators on agriculture, energy, and 
industry (to account for infrastructure). Complete data on investment proved difficult to find for 
Central America. Bourne, Chalmers, et al. (2004) also indicate factors such as violence, absence 
of corruption, political stability, and civic freedoms as contributing to economic growth—as such 
these variables are included in Model 3. A variable on Foreign Direct Investment (lagged one 
year) is also included as FDI has long been known to be positively correlated to the growth of 
developing countries (Chowdhury and Mavrotas 2006). The model on tourism expenditures was 
composed by assuming many of the same similarities to the model on GDP growth. Additionally, 
all models include country dummy variables. These variables are used to pick up differences 
between countries that cannot be otherwise accounted for. All of the models also include a 
                                                          
7
 This variable is taken from the World Bank’s Databank and is a measure of the number of women in national 
parliament.  
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“Year” variable. This variable captures changes in the dependent variable that occur solely 
because of time trends.  
The distinction between “arms” and” small arms” is an important one to be made for the 
sake of this paper. “Arms” in general includes all types of weapon categories from artillery 
weapons that require the use of several persons, to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. 
Contrarily, Small arms refer to weapons that can be used to their full effect by only one person. 
Data on small arms imports is used rather than arms imports because the aim of this project is to 
detect the damage that can be caused by just one person. Additionally, small arms are by far the 
most popular weapon used in conflicts in developing nation, whereas as Major Conventional 
Arms (MCAs) are virtually non-existent.  
4.3: Full Data Review  
 Data on small arms imports are obtained from the UN Comtrade database. Comtrade 
contains detailed import and export data for a wide-ranging set of commodities. It is the largest 
accessible trade database with more than 1 billion records. The data range from 1962 to the most 
recent year, and is available for roughly 200 countries and areas. Data in Comtrade is updated 
continuously after it is standardized by the U.N. All values of yearly imports and exports are in 
current US dollars. In order to correct for this, A GDP Deflator from the IMF is used and applied 
to each year.  
 Data on arms and ammunition trade within Comtrade are available for 194 countries 
dating back to 1988. Comtrade includes sixteen different categories of SALW for a country; 
however for my imports data only four of these categories are used. These four are then 
aggregated, giving the final value of SALW imports for a given country and year. The four 
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categories are: Military weapons, other than hand guns, swords, etc; revolvers and pistols; parts 
and accessories of revolvers or pistols; and Parts and accessories nes of weapons, nes. These four 
categories are chosen because they best represent the types of SALW used in armed conflict 
today. The other twelve categories not included in my data set are composed of parts, 
ammunition, and weapons not used in conflict such as hunting rifles or flare guns.  
 Data on most other variables are obtained through the World Bank. Through their 
databank, the World Bank provides free and open access to a comprehensive set of time series 
data on economic, social, and political indicators for 246 countries, regions, and socioeconomic 
classifications across the globe. Most of the data used in this paper comes from the World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance subset within Databank. Data within 
the WDI and GDF subset are collected through official sources, although some adjustments are 
made to account for fiscal and calendar year discrepancies. In order to ensure data from 
developing countries are of the highest possible quality the World Bank uses the Data Quality 
Assessment Framework (DQAF), which was developed in collaboration with the IMF, to assess 
data quality by using best practices and internationally accepted concepts and definitions in 
statistics. DQAF facilitates a comprehensive view of data quality, one that recognizes 
interrelations, including tradeoffs, among elements of quality and allows emphases to vary across 
data categories and uses/users. 
 The World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) is also an initiative 
of the World Bank, but is a separate 
project. The WGI consist of six broad 
The WGI’s define governance as: “The traditions and 
institutions by which authority in country is exercised. This 
includes the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored, and replaced; the capacity of government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them.” 
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indicators of the quality of governance for over 200 countries since 1996.  The categories are: 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These indicators are 
compiled from several hundred variables obtained from 31 different data sources that capture 
perceptions of governance as reported by survey respondents, non-governmental organizations, 
commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations worldwide.  
4.4 Descriptive Statistics  
 This section details the descriptive statistics of the dataset used in my models. Graphs 5, 
6, and 7 show time trends for the dependent variables for each of the models from 1995-2011.
8
 
Graph 8 shows the time trend of arms imports per capita. The variation of the independent 
variable in Graph 8 is a good sign, assuming results are significant, as it means the results are 
robust this frequent variation. Conversely, the continuity of Graph 7 could mean less robust 
results.  
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 Graph 5 does not include 1997, ’99, and ’01 as the WGI were not reported for those years.  
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 Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables used in my regressions. One 
interesting finding of the descriptive statistics is that the mean on the Stability and Corruption 
indicators is negative. This indicates that instability and corruption is more of a problem than not 
for Central America and Mexico over this time period. Other WGI that are negative are Rule of 
Law and Government Effectiveness (Govt Effective).  Voice and Accountability is the only WGI 
registering a positive mean. This indicator is a measurement of the perceptions of voting rights, 
freedom of expression and association, and media rights. See Appendix 1 for a full elaboration 
on variable definitions and their sources.  
Table 3-Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. deviation  Min Max 
Agriculture  12.626 6.781 3.462 40.508 
Armed forces  0.919 0.339 0.446 1.914 
Corrupt  -0.354 0.425 -1.033 0.783 
Education 109.538 6.274 88.213 121.126 
Energy  795.107 323.888 480.061 1636.928 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Graph 8: Per Capita Arms Imports to 
Central America and Mexico, 1995-2011 
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Female Parliament  15.252 8.807 0 36.6 
FDI (1 year) 4.254 3.067 -1.106 14.929 
GDP growth 0.055 0.059 -0.201 0.295 
Govt Effective -0.248 0.405 -0.96 0.383 
Imports per capita lag (1 year) 0.201 0.159 0 1.013 
Intentional Homicides9 29.089 25.08 5.304 139.132 
Industry  3.842 5.151 3.842 24.803 
Life Expectancy  72.828 3.257 64.986 79.315 
Population  17680598 32918013 216500 1.15E+08 
Rule of Law -0.466 0.494 -1.188 0.66 
Stability  -0.147 0.478 -1.083 0.989 
Tour Expend10 11.089 23.58 0 93.768 
Unemployment  7.11 3.735 1.3 16.9 
Voice and Accountability  0.196 0.486 -0.577 1.167 
 
4.5 Problems Encountered With Data 
 Finding data on economic indicators that was reported consistently enough to be used in 
regressions proved to be a challenge for this paper. Originally, I had desired to measure more 
specific economic indicators against the imports of small arms in order to draw more specific 
conclusions on the economic impacts of small arms imports. Infrastructure and Investment 
variables such as the export of ICT goods, container port traffic, and private investment in 
specific sectors such as energy and telecoms were desired, but data for those indicators in Central 
America was scant. Ultimately it was determined that GDP growth and growth of tourism 
expenditures were sufficient in measuring some extent of economic growth, although they have 
their weaknesses—mainly that they are two large of measures to be impacted by the import of 
small arms, especially GDP growth.  
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Other data which was sought but underreported in Central America were data on 
displaced persons due to conflict. This variable would have been a beneficial addition to 
measuring the extent of conflict and could have been used in all models. An indicator of wealth 
inequality, such as the GINI coefficient would have been a good supplemental independent 
variable for all of the models, and could potentially have been used as a dependent variable in its 
own separate model. However, the GINI coefficient and other indicators of wealth inequality are 
severely underreported in the World Bank’s Databank for Central America. For Model 2 
(Corruption), numerous indicators on social equity provided by the World Bank were desired, 
but very seldom reported for Central America. Specifically variables such as the gender equality 
ratio, policies for social inclusion/equity cluster average, property rights and rule-based 
governing rating, and the social protection rating would have made good control variables in 
Model 2 as these factors are cited in Treisman (2000) as leading to corruption.  
This paper conducts its analysis on only the legal trade of SALW. One reason for this is 
that the “Illegal trade” of SALW can be a confusing term. In its clearest sense, it is an arms trade 
where both parties are operating in the black market. However confusion arises when one party 
is trading legally, and the other is trading illegally, which happens frequently as different 
countries have different characteristics for illegal arms. It can also cause confusion when an arms 
order passes through more countries than just the seller and recipient party, which happens 
frequently. Going forward, an internationally recognized definition of illegal trade should be 
agreed upon whereby all countries can gain a clearer knowledge of what is legal and what is 
illegal. 
Additionally, by examining solely the legal trade this paper also hopes to emphasize that 
negative consequences of arms transfers can occur even through legal channels. Despite that the 
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majority of policy initiatives to combat SALW proliferation focus on weakening the black 
market, it’s important to realize that legally traded weapons are often at the forefront of crime 
and conflict, and the vast majority of illegal small arms were manufactured in accordance with 
the law. Therefore, a full understanding of the legal trade is just as necessary to stop the violence 
in developing nations that is linked to the SALW trade. If the hypotheses of this paper are 
verified, it will help governments realize that many times it is the legal trade that is to blame for 
the misuse of SALW, and that they need to examine their own behavior when as it pertains to 
small arms trade to developing countries instead of looking outward and blaming criminals.  
The World Bank discourages using the WGI to make strong cross country and year-to-
year comparisons as each yearly figure is accompanied by standard errors. The standard errors 
are a result of the number of sources of data available for a country, and the extent to which these 
sources agree with each other. Their use indicates the reality that governance is difficult to 
measuring using any kind of data. The use of these standard errors is a step up from other 
measurements of data where they are left implicit or ignored altogether. Despite caution against 
interpreting the figures from year-to-year or across years; they are more accurate to interpret over 
longer periods of time, such as a decade, when the standard error is less likely to make a 
difference in the interpretation.   
Section 5: Results 
 Table 4 shows the results of all four models. I find that arms imports per capita (lagged 
one year) is not statistically significant in any of the four models, that is arms imports per capita 
does not lead to reduced economic growth by increasing stability or corruption, or decreasing 
GDP growth or tourism expenditures.  
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Table 4—Regression Results on Imports per Capita (lagged one year)                                                  
P-values and lags in parenthesis 
 
Variable:  Stability Corruption 
GDP 
Growth  
Tourism 
Expenditures  
     Imports per capita (1 year) 0.112 -0.136 -0.091 -5.429 
 
(0.621) (0.533) (0.238) (0.231) 
Armed forces  0.006    
 
(0.971)    
Agriculture  -0.018  -0.004  
 
(0.468)  (0.548)  
Corrupt  -0.164  -0.022  
 
(0.361)  (0.673)  
Democracy   -0.143  -12.397 
 
 (0.282)  (0) 
Education  0.011 -0.002 -1.310 
 
 (0.156) (0.638) (0) 
Energy  0  0.000 0.020 
 
(0.834)  (0.633) (0) 
Female Parliament   0.001   
 
 (0.869)   
FDI (1 year)   -0.001  
 
  (0.780)  
GDP growth 0.352 -0.206   
 
(0.54) (0.666)   
Govt Effective  0.606   
 
 (0.007)   
Industry  -0.004 0.003 0.007 0.030 
 
(0.535) (0.663) (0) (0.773) 
Intentional Homicides11 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.023 
 
(0.374) (0.763) (0.664) (0.74) 
Life Expectancy  0.197  0.006 10.991 
 
(0.019)  (0.888) (0) 
Population    0.000  
 
  (0.401)  
Rule of Law 0.007 0.423 -0.053  
 
(0.981) (0.061) (0.518)  
Stability   -0.008 -0.018 -6.162 
 
 (0.954) (0.72) (0.051) 
Tour Expend12 -0.007  0.003  
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12
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(0.236)  (0.258)  
Unemployment  0.002 -0.003 -0.002  
 
(0.931) (0.826) (0.784)  
Voice and Accountability  0.403  -0.050  
 
(0.094)  (0.491)  
Year -0.056 -0.001 -0.003 -1.357 
 
(0.009) (0.908) (0.716) (0) 
Belize  0.073 0.077 -0.379 -44.421 
 
(0.926) (0.737) (0.668) (0) 
Costa Rica  -0.264 0.342 -0.354 -91.741 
 
(0.716) (0.277) (0.674) (0) 
El Salvador  0.993 0.150 -0.423 -8.746 
 
(0.19) (0.554) (0.584) (0.046) 
Guatemala 0.911 0.448 -0.384 16.619 
 
(0.246) (0.108) (0.610) (0) 
Honduras  0.785 0.166 -0.414  
 
(0.269) (0.536) (0.603)  
Nicaragua 0.959 0.447 -0.402 -4.583 
 
(0.184) (0.119) (0.622) (0.116) 
Panama  -0.207 -0.124 -0.407 -59.549 
 
(0.754) (0.473) (0.628) (0) 
Constant  99.072 1.284 6.690 2100.021 
 
(0.0096) (0.953) (0.665) (0) 
Observations  64 59 63 73 
R-squared  0.92023 0.928 0.556 0.987 
      The only variables of significance in Model 1 are life expectancy and year; indicating that 
political stability leads to increased life expectancy, and that much of the trends in the political 
stability indicator for Central America from 1995-2011 are due to chronological events. 
Government effectiveness is the only variable found to be significant in Model 2. The positive 
coefficient here is not surprising since countries with more well-run government institutions are 
expected to experience less corruption. Model 3 finds only “Industry” to be statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient and strong significance were expected since it is a broad 
variable that is directly related to economic growth.  Lastly, Model 4 finds variables such as 
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democracy, education, life expectancy, year, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Panama to affect 
tourism expenditures; however, arms imports have no effect.  
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
It is possible that the inclusiveness of these models is due to the region already being 
awash with SALW. If the region had indeed been over-supplied with SALW up until 1995, as 
many security scholars speculate, then perhaps no additional negative affects result from inflows 
of additional weapons. If this project were to be expanded to include a better dataset and more 
carefully selected variables then perhaps we would see superior, and possibly significant—
results. Additionally, to test for the “over-supply” hypothesis, data on the current stock of 
weapons could be obtained, inputted in the above models, and then compared to the arms 
imports variable. However, as the models currently stand there is no significant impact of small 
arms transfers to Central America and Mexico on economic development in the decades 
following the cessation of civil wars that plagued the region from the late 1970’s to the early 
1990’s.    
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Appendix 1 Full Variable Definition and Sources: 
Variable  
Full Definition  Measurement  Source  
Agriculture  
Agriculture value added to GDP 
% of GDP World Bank 
Databank 
Armed forces  Armed forces personnel in 
country 
% of total labor 
force  
World Bank 
Databank 
Corrupt  
Control of Corruption 
Scale (-2.5, 2.5) World Bank 
WGI  
Education Total enrollment in education % of population 
of official 
primary 
education age  
World Bank 
Databank 
Energy  
Use of primary energy before 
transformation to other end-use 
fuels 
kg of oil 
equivalent per 
capita 
World Bank 
Databank 
Female Parliament  Number of women in national 
parliament  
Persons World Bank 
Databank 
FDI lag (1 year) 
Foreign Direct Investment  
Constant 2005 
US$ 
World Bank 
Databank 
GDP growth 
Annual growth of gross domestic 
product  
% (GDP figures 
are in constant 
2005 US$) 
World Bank 
Databank 
Govt Effective Perceptions of quality of public 
service  
Scale (-2.5, 2.5) World Bank 
WGI  
Imports per capita lag (1 
year) Imports of small arms per capita 
Constant 2005 
US$ 
U.N. Comtrade 
Intentional Homicides 
Estimates of unlawful homicides 
purposely inflicted  
Per 100,000 of 
the population  
World Bank 
Databank 
Industry  
Industry value added to GDP 
% of GDP World Bank 
Databank 
Life Expectancy 
Number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing 
patterns of mortality at the time 
of its birth were to stay the same 
throughout its life 
Years World Bank 
Databank 
Hicks 40 
 
Population  Number of persons living in 
country 
Persons  World Bank 
Databank 
Rule of Law 
Perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society  
Scale (-2.5, 2.5) World Bank 
WGI  
Stability  
Perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be 
overthrown by violent means 
Scale (-2.5, 2.5) World Bank 
WGI  
Tour Expend Annual revenue from tourism 
expenditures 
Per 100 million 
of the 
population 
(Constant 2005 
US$) 
World Bank 
Databank 
Unemployment  
Share of the labor force that is 
without work but available for 
and seeking employment 
% of total labor 
force  
World Bank 
Databank 
Voice and Accountability  
Perceptions of freedom of 
election, association, media, and 
expression in a country 
Scale (-2.5, 2.5) World Bank 
WGI  
 
